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I. INTRODUCTION

Freedom of the press is widely recognized as a bulwark of American constitutional democracy. The First Amendment guarantees the
right of publishers to disseminate often controversial information.' Our
highest court has confirmed this right on numerous occasions.2 However, our judicial system has yet to delineate the precise limitations of
that right.
In recent years, the issue has arisen as to whether the First
Amendment should be interpreted to protect publishers from tort liability for the advertisements they print. Because publishers merely provide
a forum for the dissemination of commercial information, they play a
limited third-party role in transactions between advertisers and the
public. Thus, the question of third-party tort liability is raised when a
publisher, touting the products or services of another, prints an advertisement which subsequently results in injury to a member of the public.
This issue has been addressed by two recent federal circuit court
cases, Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc.,' and Braun v.
Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc.4 As their names indicate, both cases
involve the same defendant, Soldier of Fortune Magazine (SOF). Likewise, both cases share astounding factual similarities and were decided
using identical legal standards. However, because the Supreme Court
has never decided whether the First Amendment should be interpreted
to protect publishers from tort liability for the products and services
they advertise, a split of authority has developed between the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits on this issue.'
The purpose of this Note is threefold. First, it will present a brief
historical survey of the development of First Amendment protection for

1. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co.
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
3. 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1024 (1990).
4. 968 F.2d 1110 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1028 (1993).
5. The United States Supreme Court, by denying certiorari in both Eimann and
Braun, has declined to resolve the issue of third-party publisher liability based on these two
particular cases.
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commercial speech. Second, by examining the legal analysis applied by
the Eimann and Braun courts, this Note will explain how the two
circuits courts arrived at entirely inconsistent results from practically
identical fact patterns. This explanation will expose the logical weaknesses inherent in the Eleventh Circuit's overly restrictive interpretation
of SOF's First Amendment publishing rights. Finally, by applying the
modem commercial speech precedent, this Note will propose how the
U.S. Supreme Court should resolve the publisher liability issue if actually confronted with the Eimann/Braun split.
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH PROTECTION

The Supreme Court, through a rather lengthy line of cases, has
developed what is generally recognized today as the commercial speech
doctrine. Because this doctrine has undergone dramatic change since its
inception, only the landmark cases will be addressed. Generally, the
commercial speech doctrine addresses the level of protection that commercial speech,6 as opposed to core speech,7 should be afforded under
the First Amendment. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has "never
squarely addressed the issue of what role editorial discretion plays in
the commercial speech doctrine."8 The result is a clear lack of precedent to which publishers can conform in choosing what advertisements
to print. Instead, publishers and the lower courts have been forced to
rely on Supreme Court precedent governing direct state restrictions of
commercial speech under the commercial speech doctrine.

6. The Supreme Court has defined commercial speech as speech which "does no
more than propose a commercial transaction." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1980).
7. Core speech has been defined as "political speech, or speech critical of policies
and officials." GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 972, 1128 (11th ed. 1985).
8. Lisa F. Firenze, Note, Publisher'sLiability for Commercial Advertisements: Testing
the Limits of the First Amendment, 23 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 137, 145-46 (1990)

[hereinafter Firenze].
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In the Beginning; The Traditional Commercial Speech Doctrine

The Supreme Court, in Valentine v. Chrestensen,9 announced the
inception of what would become the traditional commercial speech
doctrine. In ruling on the constitutionality of distributing printed advertisements in the streets of New York,'0 the Valentine court held that
the First Amendment does not protect commercial speech from government intrusion. Specifically, the Court stated that while one may lawfully "exercise ... the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion" in the city streets, the Constitution does not forbid
government from restraining the dissemination of "purely commercial
advertising."" Curiously, the Court made little effort to explain why
the two types of speech warrant such differing levels of First Amendment protection.
Twenty two years later, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan," the
Supreme Court began to dissolve the foundations of the traditional
commercial speech doctrine. Specifically, the Court recognized that at
least some types of commercial speech are entitled to First Amendment
protection. 3 At issue in Sullivan was a paid advertisement which both
criticized public officials in various cities for alleged civil rights violations and solicited donations to further the civil rights movement. 4 In
the libel suit that followed, the Supreme Court focused its commercial
speech analysis on the content of the disputed speech. 5 Specifically,
the Court held that the traditional commercial speech doctrine, allowing
no First Amendment protection for advertisements, applied only to
purely commercial advertising; 6 conversely, advertising which communicates information "of the highest public interest and concern," like

9. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).

10. At issue was an anti-littering ordinance which city officials had cited in preventing
handbills
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

from being distributed. Id. at 53.
Id.at 54.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id. at 266-67.
Id. at 256-59.
See Firenze, supra note 8, at 146.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266.
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the advertisement at issue in Sullivan, should be entitled to First
Amendment protection.17
Significantly, the Court further acknowledged that a state can restrict the exercise of commercial speech just as effectively through its
tort laws as it can through direct governmental regulation." Thus, the
Court clearly implied that when overly restrictive state tort laws threaten the public's vital interest in receiving commercial information, those
laws are constitutionally impermissible. 9
B. A Turning Point for Protection; The Modern Commercial Speech
Doctrine
Commercial speech reached its height of First Amendment protection in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.2" This case involved a consumer advocate group's
protest of a Virginia statute prohibiting pharmacists from advertising
prescription drug prices.2 ' The Supreme Court struck down the statute,:
explaining that merely because an "advertiser's interest is a purely
economic one ... hardly disqualifies him from protection under the
' Applying a balancing test, the Court held, specifFirst Amendment."22
ically, that the free flow of commercial information to consumers outweighs the state's paternalistic interest in promoting professionalism in
the pharmacist/customer relationship.' In fact, the Court confirmed
that a "particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial
information ... may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest
in the day's most urgent political debate."24

17. Id.
18. Id. at 277 (the Court specifically refers to direct government regulation through

state criminal sanctions).
19. Id.
20. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
21. Id. at 749-50. The plaintiff Board argued that dissemination of prescription drug
prices constitutes an unprofessional publication. Id. at 749-51. Because the Board is responsible for regulating the professional standards of all pharmacists in Virginia, it has the authority to discipline its members who advertise such prices. Id.
22. Id. at 762.
23. Id. at 769-70.
24. Id. at 763. The Court pointed out, however, that many commercial messages seem
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While the Court did allow broad First Amendment protection for
commercial speech, it did not grant it full protection.25 Instead, the
Court reasoned that "commonsense" differences exist between types of
commercial s-peech and that a "different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the flow of... commercial information is unim' For instance, commercial speech is more
paired."26
easily verified,
oftentimes, than news reporting because the advertiser presumably
knows more about his product or service than do customers." Thus,
advertisers presumably require less protection from the possible consequences of harmful advertising than news repprters need for faulty
factual verification. Also, because advertising has an economic motive,
there is less chance that commercial speech will be discouraged by
state regulation." Thus, the Court concluded that commercial speech
is far less susceptible to the chilling effects of state regulation than is
core speech. Accordingly, it requires a slightly lesser degree of First
Amendment protection.29
The modem commercial speech doctrine was announced in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission. In this
case, the Supreme Court struck down a New York Public Service
Commission regulation prohibiting private electrical utilities from advertising to promote the use of electricity." In determining whether
any commercial expression should receive First Amendment protection
from state regulation, the Court combined a number of holdings from
its previous commercial speech cases to arrive at a four-part test.32
to have a much greater "public interest element" than do others. Id. at 764.
25. See Albert P. Mauro, Jr., Note, Commercial Speech After Posadas and Fox: A
Rational Basis Wolf in Intermediate Sheep's Clothing, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1931, 1937 (1992)
[hereinafter Mauro] (citing 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24).
26. 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24.
27. Id.

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
31. Id. at 561. The case arose when the Commission attempted to prevent electrical
utilities from promoting the purchase of utility services. Id. at 558. The Commission contended that promotional advertising was contrary to the national policy of energy conservation. Id. at 559. Central Hudson opposed the ban, claiming a First Amendment privilege to
advertise its product. Id. at 558-60.
32. Id. at 566.
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First, the expression must be one that the First Amendment is able to

protect, which means it "at least must concern lawful activity and not
be misleading."33' Second, the government's interest in regulating the
' Third, the restriction at issue must dispeech must be "substantial."34
' Finally, the rerectly advance "the government interest asserted."35
striction must be no "more extensive than is necessary to serve that

interest."36 In applying the four-part test to the facts in Central Hudson, the Court found that the state's interests in promoting energy
conservation and fair rate structures represented "clear and substantial

government[ ] interest[s]." 37 Additionally, the Court found a direct
relationship between the Commission's regulation and the state's interest in energy conservation." However, the Court ultimately invalidated

the regulation when it found that the Commission's "complete suppression of speech ordinarily protected by the First Amendment" was more

than necessary to promote the state's interest in preserving
extensive
39
energy.

C. Fox and Posadas; Quietly Eroding the Protection Standard
The practical effect of Central Hudson was to consolidate numerous commercial speech restriction holdings into a comprehensive test
designed to consider the respective rights of both advertisers and the

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
drawn.'
36. Id. The Court explained that restrictions on speech must be "'narrowly
Id. at 565. Furthermore, regulations may not restrict speech "when narrower restrictions on
expression would serve . . . [the state's] interest as well." Id. Nor may the state restrict
speech that "poses no danger to the asserted state interest." Id.
37. Id. at 569. The first part of the test concerning misleading or illegal communications was not substantially at issue. Id at 566. The Court did, however, address the trial
court issue of whether advertising by a company holding a service monopoly can claim First
Amendment protection for its speech. Id. at 566-68. The Court answered affimnatively. Id.
38. Id. at 569. However, the Court did not accept the Commission's rate fairness argument, reasoning that the connection "between the advertising prohibition and . . . [Central
Hudson's] rate structure is, at most, tenuous." Id
39. Id. at 569-72. The Commission could have prevailed had it demonstrated that its
legitimate conservation goals could not be achieved with a less restrictive regulation. Id.at
571.
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state in regulating those advertisers.4 ° High court cases following Central Hudson, however, began to undermine much of the protection that
advertisers gained in Virginia Pharmacy and Central Hudson. In
Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,4 '
the Supreme Court applied Central Hudson's four-part test to governmental restrictions on casino gambling advertising aimed at Puerto
Rican citizens.42
Even though the citizens of Puerto Rico are legally permitted to
gamble in its casinos, the Puerto Rican legislature imposed restrictions
on domestic casino advertisements to lessen the impact of those advertisements on its citizens.43 The legislature believed that casino gambling could be adverse to the health and welfare of its citizens.44 Despite its rejection of purely paternalistic speech restrictions in Virginia
Pharmacy and government overreaching in Central Hudson, the Court
upheld the restrictions based primarily on the Puerto Rican
government's assertion that the restrictions were in the best interests of
the Puerto Rican people.4
In Board of Trustees v. Fox,46 the Court used the Central Hudson
test to determine if a state university's interest in promoting an educational atmosphere could prevent commercial enterprises from operating
on its campus.47 In upholding the constitutionality of the ban, the
Court found, consistent with its holding in Posadas, that the
university's interest in promoting an educational atmosphere was substantial, and that the university had demonstrated a "reasonable" fit
between its restriction and its educational interest.4" Therefore, Central
40. See Firenze, supra note 8, at 154-55.

41. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
42. Id, at 330.
43. Id. at 341.

44. Id.
45. Id. at 344. See also Donald B. Allegro & John D. Ladue, Case Comment, Eimann
v. Soldier of Fortune and 'Negligent Advertising' Actions: Commercial Speech in an Era of
FirstAmendment Protection, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 157, 162-63 (1989).
46. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
47. Id. at 475-81. The action was brought by students who were prevented from holding "Tupperware" parties on campus. Id. at 472.
48. Id. at 480. The Court specifically stated that government regulation need not necessarily meet the least restrictive means prong of the Central Hudson test. Id. Rather, the
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Hudson is still the controlling test to be applied in commercial speech
cases. However, as a result of Fox and Posadas, Central Hudson has
lost much of its ability to curb state-imposed restrictions.4 9
All of the cases examined thus far have substantially shaped the
government's ability to restrict commercial speech. With the exception
of Sullivan, however, all of the holdings are necessarily limited to state
action against private advertisers."0 In fact, every decision, from Valentine through Central Hudson to Posadas and Fox, has involved the
constitutionality of state-imposed restrictions against advertisers. In
some cases, however, private citizens bring civil tort suits which indirectly threaten the free speech rights of third-party publishers to advertise the products and services of particular advertisers. Unfortunately,
the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of First Amendment
protection for third-party publishers in the negligent advertising context.
Consequently, the lower courts have often been restricted to the closest
available precedent - the commercial speech restriction cases discussed above.
D. Some Limited State and Lower Federal Court Precedent
While the Supreme Court has been silent thus far on the issue of
publisher liability for negligent advertising, not all courts have been
equally passive. Although some state appeals courts and at least one
lower federal court have ruled on the issue, the precedent remains
scant and relatively untested. However, the currently existing authority
indicates that most courts will not be overly receptive to negligent
advertising claims against third-party publishers.

Court announced that speech restriction employing "means narrowly tailored to achieve the
desired objective" would be sufficient to uphold commercial speech restrictions. Id. (emphasis
added).
49. For a detailed analysis of the Supreme Court's journey back toward the traditional
commercial speech doctrine, see Mauro, supra note 25, at 1949-58.
50. Because the Bill of Rights was intended as a limitation upon the power of the
state exclusively, First Amendment protections are not generally applicable when the state is
not a party to the action. See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131,
166 (1948). See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §18-1 (1978).
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For instance, in Yuhas v. Mudge,5 ' a New Jersey state appeals
court held that Popular Mechanics Magazine had no duty to investigate
and test the products it advertised, even if those products were inherently dangerous.52 Such a duty, the court held, would be "impractical
and unrealistic" in light of the limited revenue generated by individual
advertisers. 3 In addition, such enormous potential for liability "would
open the doors 'to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an inde54
terminate time to an indeterminate class."'
Walters v. Seventeen Magazine 5 was a similar case in which two
young women suffered from toxic shock as a result of using tampons
they had seen advertised in Seventeen.56 Despite the plaintiffs' argument that the magazine's placement of the ad implied a specific endorsement of the product,57 a California appeals court believed otherwise.58 In upholding the trial court dismissal of the action, the Walters
court held that the creation of a tort for "negligently failing to investigate the safety of an advertised product" would unfairly force advertisers to spend huge sums of money on product testing and liability in59
surance.
Finally, in Pittman v. Dow Jones & Co.,6 a defrauded investor
sued the Wall Street Journal to recover the money he had invested in
a failed Texas financial institution." The plaintiff claimed that he had
been induced to invest in the institution after reading its fraudulent
advertisement which offered 'jumbo' interest rates on deposits" made

51.

322 A.2d 824 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974).

52. Id. at 825. This case arose after two small children were injured by fireworks
advertised in defendant's magazine. Id.at 824.
53. Id. at 825.
54. Id. (quoting Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y.
1931)); see also Goldstein v. Garlick, 318 N.Y.S.2d 370 (Sup. Ct. 1971); Pressler v. Dow
Jones & Co., 450 N.Y.S.2d 884 (App. Div. 1982); Suarez v. Underwood, 426 N.Y.S.2d 208

(Sup. Ct. 1980).
55.
56.
57.
58.

241 Cal. Rptr. 101 (Ct. App. 1987).
Id.at 101.
Id.at 102.
Id.at 103.

59. Id.
60. 662 F. Supp. 921 (E.D. La.), af'd, 834 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1987).
61. Id.
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with the institution.62 According to the plaintiff, the language of the
ad should have alerted the publisher of the Journal to possible fraud
against investors. 3 In granting summary judgment for the publisher,
the Pittman court held that the societal benefits accruing from the free
flow of commercial information outweigh the potential harm to the
individual interests of private citizens." Furthermore, the court held
that a plaintiff must allege more than "mere negligence" to recover
damages against a publisher for losses associated with the appearance
65
of an advertisement in published material.
III.

ANATOMY OF A SPLIT

During a period spanning at least nine years, Soldier of Fortune
Magazine published several thousand personal service classified advertisements, many of which were highly controversial. 6 Although none
of the ads contained explicit solicitations for violent criminal activity,
several of the ads were blamed in subsequent litigation for facilitating
murder, aggravated assault, and other violent crimes. This section will
focus on the split of authority that developed in the federal circuit
courts as to whether SOF was liable for the violent criminal activity
which occurred. The ultimate issue of third-party publisher liability will
be explored extensively throughout the discussion.
A. Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune
On February 21, 1985, Sandra Black of Bryan, Texas, was murdered by John Wayne Heam of Atlanta.67 Hearn had been paid
$10,000 to commit the murder by Sandra Black's husband, Robert,
who had previously attempted to solicit others to murder his wife."
62. Id. The record indicates that the defendant publisher was unaware of the fraudulent
nature of the advertisement before printing it.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 922.
65. Id. at 923 (quoting Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., 490 N.E.2d 898, 902 (Ohio 1986)).
66. See Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 880 F.2d 830, 832 (5th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1024 (1990).
67. Id. at 831.
68. Richard Luna, Family Wins Suit Over Ad Placed by Hit Man, PHILADELPHIA IN-
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Robert Black, unable to find a willing assassin, contacted Hearn after
reading a personal service classified advertisement that Hearn and a
partner had placed in SOF.69 The complete ad, published in the Sep-

tember, October, and November 1984 issues of SOF read:
EX-MARINES - 67-69 'Nam Vets, Ex-DI, weapons specialist - jungle
warfare, pilot, M.E., high-risk assignments, U.S. or overseas. (404) 9917628.70

1. The Trial
Following the murder, Sandra Black's son, Gary Wayne Black,
and her mother, Marjorie Eimann, filed a federal diversity action

against SOF in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama. 7' They alleged that the magazine had caused the
wrongful death of Sandra by negligently publishing Heam's personal
service ad. 72 Eimann presented evidence that SOF had accepted classified ads for a number of years from persons offering services such as

"Mercenary for hire," "bounty hunter" and "dirty work." '

Eimann

also presented evidence that a number of SOF's classifieds had been
tied to actual or planned criminal activity, and that the media had
regularly portrayed these criminal links.74 Eimann presented further
evidence that law enforcement officials had contacted SOF on two
separate occasions while investigating crimes linked with SOF's personal service ads.75
QUIRER, Mar. 4, 1988, at A03. Robert Black had approached at least four friends and coworkers since 1982 in an attempt to solicit their assistance in the murder. Eimann, 880 F.2d
at 831.
69. Eimann, 880 F.2d at 832.
70. Id at 831. According to Hearn's later trial testimony, "Ex-DI" meant ex-drill instructor and "M.E." meant multi-engine planes. Id.
71. Id. at 832.
72. Id
73. Id. Eimann offered into evidence approximately 36 such ads from SOF's inception
in 1975 until September 1984. Id.
74. Id. Accounts of criminal activity tied to SOF personal service ads had appeared in
the Associated Press, United Press International, Time, and Newsweek. Also, the local media
centered around SOF's home city of Boulder, Colorado, including the Denver Post and the
Rocky Mountain News, had carried a number of the stories. Id.
75. Id. One crime involved a Houston man later convicted of murdering his wife after
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Finally, Eimann presented the expert testimony of Dr. Park Dietz,
a forensic psychiatrist.76 Dr. Dietz testified that, given the context of
SOF and its personal service ads, the average SOF subscriber "would
understand some phrases in SOF's ads as solicitations for illegal activity ....,7 Dr. Dietz further testified that the connotation in which an
SOF classified ad appears can be distinguished from the connotation of
the average magazine ad because of SOF's distinctive paramilitary
mystique. 7' Dietz concluded his testimony by commenting that,
foreseeably, any SOF classified ad, including the Hearn ad, could be
related to the commission of domestic crimes. However, most of the
SOF ads contained no words that would explicitly identify them as
criminal solicitations with any level of certainty.79
SOF began its defense by calling John Heam as a witness, who
testified that he and his partner" never intended to solicit criminal
activity by placing the advertisement in the SOF classifieds. Rather,
they hoped to secure employment as bodyguards or security specialists." However, instead of receiving calls for legitimate employment,
over ninety percent of those responding to the ad sought Hearn's services for various illegal activities, most of them violent in nature. 2
Heam further testified that the ad did generate one legitimate employment offer. 3 Hearn concluded by testifying that neither he nor his

attempting to hire a poisons expert from an SOF personal service ad. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. The average issue of SOF typically detailed dramatic episodes of political intrigue, as well as the exploits of guerilla warriors, foreign mercenaries, and soldiers involved
in the Vietnam conflict. See generally SOLDIER OF FORTUNE MAGAZINE prior to September

1984.
78. Eimann, 880 F.2d at 883.
79. Id. Dietz noted, however, that crimes had been linked not only to SOF ads that
appeared to solicit unlawful activity on their faces, but also to ads that "seemed relatively

innocuous." Id. (quoting Dietz's trial testimony).
80.
pated in
81.
82.

Heam's partner quit the venture after the first advertisement ran and never particiany ad-related ventures. Id. at 831.
Id.
Id. These illegal proposals included beatings, kidnappings, jailbreaks, bombings, and

murder. Id.
83. Id. Hearn was paid a fee for placing bodyguards with a company providing security services for a Lebanese oil conglomerate. Id.
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partner had a criminal record when they placed the ad84 and that neither one had received a dishonorable discharge from the military.85
SOF relied more heavily, however, on the testimony of Colonel
Robert K. Brown, its president.8 6 Brown testified that he had no
knowledge of any criminal activity linked with SOF personal service
classifieds prior to 1984, nor did he suspect any. 7 Other SOF staff
members testified that they understood "gun for hire" and "high risk
assignments" to imply nothing but lawful activity.88
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury was asked if Heam's ad
was related to unlawful activity. 9 It answered affirmatively." The
jury was also asked whether SOF should be imputed with the knowledge that Hearn's ad reasonably could be interpreted as an offer to
engage in illegal activity.9 Such knowledge, the trial judge instructed,
must be based on "(1) the relation to illegal activity appear[ing] on the
ad's face;" or (2) the ad, read in context, "would lead a reasonable
publisher . . . to conclude that the advertisement could reasonably be
interpreted as an offer to commit crimes."'92 Again, the jury answered
affinmatively, and returned a verdict in favor of Eimann for $9.4 million.93

84. Id. at 832. Heam was later sentenced to three concurrent life sentences for the
murders of Sandra Black and two others. Id.
85. Id. Also, Heam included his real name, correct telephone number, and correct address in the ad. Id.
86. Id. at 833.
87. Id.
88. Id. Joan Steele, SOF's advertising manager, testified that she understood Heam's
ad to solicit employment as a "professional bodyguard or security consultant rather than a
contract killer." Id.

89. Id (quoting the district court jury instructions).
90. Id.
91.

Id.

92. Id. (quoting the district court jury instructions). The district court defined "context"
as the "magazine's (1)'nature'; (2) other advertisements; (3) articles; (4) readership; and (5)
knowledge, if any, that other advertisements in the magazine could reasonably be interpreted
as offers to engage in illegal activity." Id.
93. Id. The award consisted of $1.9 million in compensatory damages and $7.5 million
in punitive damages. Id.
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2. The Appeal
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit questioned whether SOF, as a matter
of law, owed any duty of reasonable care to the public; and if it did,
whether SOF's printing of the Heam ad constituted a breach of that
duty.9 4 For reasons it did not make entirely clear, the court assumed
the existence of a duty to protect the public from unreasonable risks of
harm.95 It then moved on to the potential breach analysis.96
In determining whether SOF breached its assumed duty, the court
applied the standard Texas risk-utility balancing test.97 This test balances liability "on whether the burden of adequate precautions . . . is
less than the probability of harm . . . multiplied by the gravity of the
resulting injury."98
In applying the risk-utility balancing test to the facts of the
Eimann case, the court first examined the probability/gravity of harm
side of the equation.99 Citing the well-published links between SOF
classifieds and criminal activity as well as the police investigations of
SOF ad-related crimes, the court stated that the SOF ads "presented
more than a remote risk" of causing harm to the public."0 Noting the
serious and violent nature of the crimes linked to SOF personal service

94. Id. at 834-36.
95. Id. at 835.
96. Id.
97. This test was first applied by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). For a Texas case applying this test, see
Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. 1983) (employers owe a duty of
reasonable care in protecting the public from unreasonable risks created by their employees).
Neither the district court decision nor the Fifth Circuit holding offer an explanation why
Texas law should be applied. However, the suit was based on diversity of citizenship, and
the suit was originally filed in Texas. The Supreme Court has held that "in diversity cases
the federal courts must follow conflicts of laws rules prevailing in the states in which they

sit." Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 494 (1941). It can most likely be
assumed, therefore, that the Fifth Circuit looked to Texas conflicts of law rules in deciding
to apply Texas tort law to this case.
98. Eimann, 880 F.2d at 835 (citing Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173).

99. Id.
100. Id.
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ads,"° ' including the murder of Sandra Black, the court further stated
that "the prospect of ad-inspired crime represents a threat of serious
harm."" Thus, the court concluded that the combined probability and
gravity of harm posed by SOF in publishing personal service classified
ads similar to that of Heam's was substantial. 3
On the other side of the risk-utility equation, the court focused on
the tremendous burden publishers would be forced to encounter if they
were required either to investigate or to refrain from publishing all
ambiguous ads.' 4 While Eimann conceded that SOF had no affirmative duty to investigate its ads, she did contend that SOF had a duty to
refrain from publishing any ad that was the least bit criminally suggestive. 5
Ultimately, the court agreed with SOF. Specifically, the court held
that the duty the trial jury imposed upon SOF, a duty which would
"require publishers to recognize ads that 'reasonably could be interpreted as ...offer[s] to engage in illegal activity' based on their words
or 'context' and to refrain from printing them," was a duty more onerous even than a duty to investigate the ads. 6 The court further explained that the burden placed on publishers to recognize, and to refrain from publishing, possible criminal solicitations on the face of
highly ambiguous ads is an "especially heavy burden" that outweighs
the probability and gravity of harm associated with printing the ads.' 7

101. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
102. Eimann, 880 F.2d at 835.
103. Id
104. SOF argued that upholding the district court verdict would impermissibly impose

upon SOF and other publishers a duty to investigate their ads and advertisers for suggestions
of criminal solicitation. The court agreed. Id. at 835-36. See also Yuhas v. Mudge, 322
A.2d 824 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974) (magazine had no duty to investigate the fireworks advertisement it published); Walters v. Seventeen Magazine, 241 Cal. Rptr. 101 (Ct.
App. 1987) (negligence action against publisher for printing advertisements for tampons
which led to toxic shock disallowed because advertisers cannot reasonably be expected to
investigate the safety of the products they advertise).
105. Eimann, 880 F.2d at 835-36.

106. Id. at 835 (quoting the district court jury instructions).
107. Id. at 836-37.
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Accordingly, the court specifically identified the Hearn ad as ambiguous in nature and facially innocuous." 8 The court analyzed the
most provocative phrase of the Hearn ad, "high risk assignments," as
"plausibly encompass[ing] Hearn's professed goal of recruiting candidates for bodyguard jobs."' 9 Thus, the court rejected Eimann's argument that the Hearn ad was a "readily identifiable criminal solicitation"
because "[i]ts bare terms reveal[ed] no identifiable offer to commit
crimes.""1' Finally, the court recognized that the general context in
which an advertisement is printed is not sufficiently indicative of the
nature of any particular ambiguous ad to impute that context upon the
ambiguous ad."' In other words, just because the Hearn ad, or any
other ad, is published in the presence of ads and articles containing
violent themes, that ad cannot also be assumed to connote violent
themes when the ad is ambiguous on its face."'
Thus, a unanimous Fifth Circuit reversed the district court decision, holding that, "[w]ithout a more specific indication of illegal intent
than Hearn's ad or its context provided, we conclude that SOF did not
violate the required standard of conduct by publishing an ad that later
played a role in criminal activity."".3 Curiously, however, the court
held that it did not need to specifically address SOF's First Amendment commercial speech protection arguments in order to decide the
case." 4 Instead, the court reasoned that SOF's First Amendment
protections would receive adequate consideration if those rights were
directly factored into the risk-utility balancing test."5 Thus, by omit-

108. Id. at 836.
109. Id. In support of its conclusion that the meaning and intent of the Heam ad was
ambiguous, the court referred to the legitimate bodyguard Hearn acquired through the ad.
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
110. Eimann, 880 F.2d at 836. The court pointed to the admission of Dr. Dietz,
Eimann's witness, that he could not identify specific code words of criminal intent in any
SOF ads. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
111. Eimann, 880 F.2d at 836.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 838.
114. Id. at 834. SOF argued that First Amendment protection of commercial speech
precludes any negligence action against publishers arising from the products and services
they advertise. Brief for Appellants at 24, Eimann, 880 F.2d at 830.
115. Eimann, 880 F.2d at 836.
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ting a discussion of publishers' free speech rights in advertising the
products and services of third parties, the Eimann court failed to establish a proper standard of conduct for future publishing decisions." 6'
This omission would prove to be a costly one for SOF.
7

B. Braun v. Soldier of Fortune"

On August 26, 1985, Richard Braun was shot and wounded in an
ambush as he pulled out of his driveway in suburban Atlanta." 8
When he attempted to escape the gunfire by rolling out of his car,
Braun was shot twice in the back of the head, killing him instantly." 9 Braun's sixteen20 year-old son, Michael, suffered a serious thigh
wound in the attack.
The gunnan was Sean Trevor Doutre, who had been hired to
commit the assassination by Michael Savage, a self-described "37 yearold professional mercenary.'' Savage had been hired to orchestrate
the assassination by Bruce Gastwirth and John Horton Moore, two
business associates of Braun who had made three previous attempts on
his life. 22 Moore and Savage accompanied Doutre to Braun's home
on the day of the shooting.'
Gastwirth and Moore had hired Savage in response to a personal
service advertisement Savage had placed in SOF's classifieds.' 24 The
ad, which ran from June, 1985 through March, 1986 read as follows:
GUN FOR HIRE: 37 year old professional mercenary desires jobs. Vietnam veteran. Discrete [sic] and very private. Body guard, courier, and
other special skills. All jobs considered. Phone (615) 436-9785 (days) or

116. See Firenze, supra note 8, at 138.
117. 968 F.2d 1110 (lth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1028 (1993).
118. James J. Kilpatrick, "Gun for Hire" Wasn't an Offer to Murder, DEr. FREE
PRESS, Feb. 15, 1993, at 7A.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1112.
122. Id.
123. Id.All four conspirators were eventually convicted of murder and sentenced to
various prison terms. Kilpatrick, supra note 118, at 7A.
124. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1112.
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(615) 436-4335 (nights), or write: Rt. 2, Box 682 Village Loop Road,
Gatlinburg, TN 37738."

Based on the ad, Michael Braun and his brother, Ian Braun, filed
a federal diversity suit against SOF in the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama, alleging the wrongful death of their father. 126 Michael Braun filed a separate suit for the personal injuries
he received in the attack. 27 The district court consolidated the
suits.

128

1. The Trial
At trial, the Brauns contended that, under Georgia law,129 SOF
was liable for the shootings because SOF negligently published a personal service advertisement "that created an unreasonable risk of the
solicitation and commission of violent criminal activity, including
murder."' 30 The Brauns introduced evidence that SOF had, or should
have had, prior knowledge of the likelihood that criminal activity
would be a result of publishing ads similar to Savage's.1" This
knowledge, the Brauns contended, was based on SOF's subscription to
a clipping service which provided the magazine's staff with news accounts linking SOF ads similar to Savage's with a considerable number
of criminal activities, including murder.'32 The Brauns further argued
that SOF had prior knowledge of criminal activities associated with its
ads because the magazine's staff had been contacted twice, prior to

125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. The district court sitting in Alabama applied Georgia law because, in diversity
cases, federal courts must follow the conflicts of law rules for the state in which they sit
Id. at 1114 (citing Klaxon Co., 313 U.S. at 494). Because Alabama law dictates that the
law of the state where the injury occurred is to be applied when the suit is brought in
Alabama, the district court was required to apply Georgia law in this case. Id. (citing
Bodnar v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 392 So. 2d 1161, 1162 (Ala. 1980)).
130. Id. at 1112.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1112-13. The service provided SOF with these clippings prior to Braun's
murder. Id.
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Braun's murder, by law enforcement officials investigating crimes
linked to other SOF ads.'33
SOF staffers, on the other hand, denied having knowledge of criminal activities associated with the magazine's personal service ads prior
to Braun's death. 34 Also, the advertising manager who accepted
Savage's ad testified that she assumed the "Gun for Hire" portion of
the ad referred to the legitimate services listed in the ad, rather than to
any illegal activities which some respondents to the ad may have
inferred. 3 ' Finally, Savage testified that he placed the ad with the
intention of obtaining nothing but legitimate jobs, but that the overwhelming majority of respondents to the ad sought his services for a
variety of illegal activities, including murder. 3 ' The ad did, however,
produce one legitimate job offer as a bodyguard, which Savage accept137
ed.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury was instructed that SOF
was liable to the Brauns if "the ad in question contained a clearly
identifiable risk [and] that the offer in the ad is one to commit a serious violent crime, including murder."'38 The jury was also instructed
that SOF was liable to the Brauns if, by publishing the Savage ad,
SOF had ignored a "clear and present danger of causing serious harm
to the public from criminal activity.' ' 39 Finally, after being further instructed that it must consider the facts of the case in light of the First
Amendment, the jury returned a verdict for the Brauns amounting to
$12,375,000.140

133. Id The court does not discuss whether these were the same incidents entered into
evidence in the Eimann trial. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
134. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1113.
135. Id.
136. Id at 1112. Respondents to the ad also solicited Savage's services for illegal activities such as assault and kidnapping. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id at 1113 (quoting the district court jury instructions).
139. Id
140. Id at 1114. The jury awarded $2 million in compensatory damages on the wrongful death action. Michael Braun was awarded $375,000 in compensatory damages and $10
million punitive damages on his personal injury claim. The Brauns later agreed to a reduction in the amount of punitive damages to $2 million in order to avoid a new trial. Id.
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2. The Appeal
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial jury's verdict
against SOF, 14 1 creating a split of authority between the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits on the issue of third-party publisher liability. In its
decision, the court applied a risk-utility balancing test,14 2 identical to
the test applied in Eimann, to determine whether SOF's printing of the
ad was indeed unreasonable.' 43 Under this test, a risk is unreasonable
only if it is "of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards
as the utility of the defendant's negligent conduct." 1" Thus, the Eleventh Circuit used a risk-utility balancing test to weigh the duty of care
imposed on SOF, the duty of recognizing a "clearly identifiable risk of
harm to the public," against SOF's First Amendment right to publish
certain types of protected commercial speech.'45
Not surprisingly, SOF based its appeal largely on the Eimann
precedent.'46 SOF argued that Eimann had rendered the imposition of
a risk-utility balancing test improper because the Fifth Circuit, in that
case, held that no such liability can exist by applying a risk-utility type
test to a negligent advertising case. 147 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed,
attempting to distinguish Eimann from Braun.' Eimann differed
from Braun, the court opined, in respect to the instructions given to
the respective juries.'49 Specifically, the Eimann jury was allowed to
impose liability for an advertisement that "could reasonably be interpreted' as a criminal solicitation.5 0 Because any ad could involve il-

141. Id. at 1122.
142. See Johnson v. Thompson, 143 S.E.2d 51, 53 (Ga. 1965).
143. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1115. For the Texas risk-utility balancing test applied in
Eimann, see supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
144. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1115 (quoting Johnson, 143 S.E.2d at 53). Like the Eimann
court before it, the Braun court measured the defendant's burden in taking adequate precautions against the probability of harm multiplied by the potential gravity of the harm. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.

147. Id.
148. Id. at 1115-16.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1116 (emphasis in original).
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legal activity, a publisher would be forced to reject all ambiguous
ads.' Allowing a jury to impose liability for an ad that merely
could involve an offer to commit crimes, the Eleventh Circuit held,
was "a violat[ion of] risk-utility balancing principles" because it imposed too heavy a burden of care on SOF."' Thus, it was properly
discarded.'53 The Braun jury, on the other hand, was not permitted to
impose liability for an advertisement that could reasonably be interpreted as an offer to commit crimes."' 54 Instead, it was allowed to impose liability only "if the ad on its face contained a 'clearly identifiable unreasonable risk' . . . of harm to the public.' ' 55 This standard,
the court held, did not impose the undue burden of care on SOF de56
manded under the Eimann standard.
The Eleventh Circuit further attempted to distinguish the standards
of care imposed in both cases by reexamining the contextual argument
asserted in Einann. The Eimann jury was instructed that even if the ad
in question "did not reveal its connection to illegal activity" on its
face, the jury could hold SOF liable "if a reasonably prudent publisher
would discover the connection to crime through investigation of the
ad's 'context."" 57 In contrast, the Braun jury was afforded no leeway
to examine the context of the Savage ad. Rather, the district court
allowed the jury to impose liability only if "Savage's ad 'on its face'
would convey to a reasonable publisher that the ad created a 'clearly
identifiable unreasonable risk of harm to the public."' "' Thus, because the Braun trial court supposedly imposed a more rigorous standard of liability than the Eimann trial court, and because the Braun
trial court did not require investigation into the context of the ad, the
Eleventh Circuit believed it had meaningfully distinguished the two
cases. However, as the following discussion will demonstrate, the factual and legal distinctions drawn between the cases are logically un-

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1116 (quoting the district court jury instructions).
Id.

157. Id. (citing, in part, the Eimann district court jury instructions, 880 F.2d at 883).
158. Id.
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sound. Furthermore, even if these distinctions are logically sound, they
are far too trivial in nature to account for the complete disparity in
outcomes.
C. Factually Indistinguishable Cases
Although many of the finer details vary between Eimann and
Braun, the actual fact patterns of the cases are not significantly distinguishable. While both ads contained language which may have been
somewhat suggestive of the advertiser's willingness to engage in criminal acts, each ad was fundamentally ambiguous in its overall meaning.
Therefore, neither ad contained a facial solicitation for the commission
of criminal activity.
Although both cases are factually indistinguishable, this did not
prevent the Eleventh Circuit from attempting to distinguish Eimann
from Braun. As previously noted, the Braun court considered the ad at
issue in Eimann to be "ambiguous" and "facially innocuous" because it
merely "listed the advertiser's qualifications and indicated a willingness
to accept risky assignments .
." In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit
*.".
pointed to the Braun advertiser's emphasis on his ability and willingness to "use his gun" in the commission of crimes. 6 ' In reality, however, the ads convey the exact same meaning; the fact that one ad
explicitly mentioned the use of a gun and the other merely implied it
is not a meaningful distinction. In fact, the ad at issue in Eimann identified the advertiser as a "weapons specialist."'' The use of such explicit language indicated that the ad at issue in Eimann involved more
than just implication. Rather, it indicated that the Eimann ad was every
bit as explicit and suggestive of the advertiser's ability and willingness
to use a gun as the ad at issue in Braun. Thus, the language contained
in one ad could not be validly expressed as more or less ambiguous
than the language contained in the other, and no significant factual
distinctions are therefore possible.

159. Id. at n.3 (quoting Brief for Appellees at 27, Braun, 968 F.2d at 1110).
160. Id. See also supra note 125 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 70 and accompanying text
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D. FundamentalAmbiguity of the Savage Advertisement
Even if one assumes, arguendo, that the Eleventh Circuit has
drawn a valid factual distinction between the Braun and Eimann cases,
the ad at issue in Braun is still far too ambiguous to render SOF liable. The Braun trial jury was permitted to impose liability on SOF
only if the Savage ad presented a "clearly identifiable risk of harm to
the public."'62 However, even a cursory analysis of the language of
the Savage ad reveals its fundamental ambiguity, whether it is read
phrase-by-phrase or in its entirety.
For example, the Braun court described the phrase "gun for hire"
as "sinister" and expressive of a "substantial danger of harm to the
public."' 63 However, "gun for hire" is a common figure of speech often used to describe individuals engaged in professions which can hardly be considered "sinister" and certainly do not require the use of
guns. For instance, the media has depicted trial lawyers,' 14 expert witnesses, 165 and even fashion models 166 as "guns for hire." Furthermore, even if "gun for hire" necessarily connotes the use of a gun, the
phrase does not implicate an unlawful purpose.'67 Rather, as SOF argued on appeal, "gun for hire" simply indicates that the advertiser is
proficient in the use of guns and is seeking an employer who can
utilize that skill. 68 Many legitimate jobs fit this description, including
bodyguard, courier, private detective, motorcade and armored car employee, security guard, and policeman. 69 In fact, Savage was contacted with a legitimate job offer from an employer who obviously under-

162. See supra notes 138-39, 145 and accompanying text.
163. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1121.
164. See, e.g., Eugene A. Cook et al., A Guide to the Texas Lawyer's Creed: A Mandate for Professionalism, 10 REV. LITI. 673, 677 n.4 (1991).
165. See, e.g., Ricardo Fontg, Comment, DNA Fingerprinting: A Guide to Admissibility
and Use, 57 Mo. L. REV. 501, 518 n.107 (1992) (citing New York criminal defense attorney Kerry J. Katsorhis).
166. See, e.g., Kevin Goldman, Pretty Models Are Supplanted by Drawings or a Hummingbird, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1994, at BI.
167. Brief for Appellants at 25, Braun, 968 F.2d at 1110.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 26-27.
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stood his ad as soliciting lawful employment.'70 In other words, "gun
for hire" indicates a substantial danger of harm to the public "only if it
is assumed that guns can only be used to commit crimes."''
The Eleventh Circuit also cited the phrase "professional mercenary
desires jobs" as particularly suggestive of potential criminal intent.'
Even if Savage meant this phrase to be interpreted literally,
its
meaning is nonetheless innocuous. Professional mercenaries regularly
seek a number of crucial jobs abroad, including security work in situations where conflict is all, but. imminent. 74 Thus, there is no legitimate reason to impute a shadow of illegality over a phrase which does
no more than seek employment in an entirely lawful profession.
Another phrase which alarmed the Braun court was Savage's assurance that his services would be "discreet and very private."'75 Although the Eleventh Circuit arbitrarily assigned an aura of clandestine
impropriety to this entirely innocuous phrase, 7' the practical considerations surrounding the legitimate employment Savage was seeking dictate no such impropriety. For example, bodyguards must often
"shadow" their employers at all times and in all situations.'77 Accordingly, they become privy to conversations and transactions that require
them to act with complete secrecy and discretion.'
Similarly, couriers are often entrusted with highly sensitive documents that require an
identical standard of care.'79 Therefore, any potential employee who
was not willing to be "discrete and very private" in the performance of
his duties would have little value to an employer in Savage's job market.

170. Id. at 28-29. See also supra note 137 and accompanying text.
171. Id. at 27.
172. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1121.
173. Savage could have used the term "professional mercenary" euphemistically in an
attempt to add a measure of authority to the advertisement. Brief for Appellants at 29,
Braun, 968 F.2d at 1110.
174. Id. For example, SOF points out that British mercenaries perform key roles in
escorting much of Iran's oil tanker fleet out of the Persian Gulf. Id. n.27.
175. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1121.

176. Id.
177. Brief for Appellants at 30, Braun, 968 F.2d 1110.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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Finally, the Eleventh Circuit was particularly disturbed by Savage's
"all jobs considered" language. 8 ' Clearly, the advertiser was not proposing that lie would accept any and every position offered.'8 ' Instead, he was merely suggesting that he would consider any offer and
select those he deemed most appropriate.'
Because this pick-andchoose technique is so common in other types of advertising, the Eleventh Circuit bad no logical basis to assume any suggestion of impropri"'
ety in this context. 83
Thus, phrase by phrase,'84 there is simply no language in the
Savage ad which suggests the advertiser's willingness to engage in
criminal activity. The same is undoubtedly true when the ad is read in
its entirety. In that context, as SOF argued, the ad says no more than:
I am a Vietnam vet in need of a job. I know how to handle guns, and I
am discreet. I would like to hire out as a bodyguard, a courier, or some
other position where my skills can be put to use. I will at least consider
any job. Here is how to reach me.' 5

It is entirely likely that the Eleventh Circuit ultimately upheld the
trial court verdict against SOF because it read the ad in hindsight after the murder occurred.' 86 Had the Braun court analyzed the Say-

180. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1121.
181. Brief for Appellants at 31, Braun, 968 F.2d 1110.
182. Id.
183. Id
184. The remaining phrases of the Savage ad are so innocuous as to warrant only cursory discussion. For example, "Vietnam veteran" denotes no more than prior military service.
If anything else can be inferred from this simple term, it is only that "the advertiser had
previously used firearms in an entirely lawful profession." Id. at 29-30. "Body guard, courier, and other special skills" refers only to the types of jobs Savage was seeking. Id. at 30.
Because "special skills" are "impliedly of the same nature as those required by a bodyguard
or courier[, t]here is certainly no implication that the special skills are unlawful ones." Id. at
31. Finally, the rest of the ad lists Savage's actual day and night phone numbers and address. Had Savage originally intended to solicit criminal activity, it seems highly doubtful
that he would have offered his actual address and telephone numbers to law enforcement
officials through publication. Id at 32. Thus, any doubts SOF may have had "concerning
the authentic and harmless nature of the Savage ad .. . would have been dispelled by the

address and telephone numbers at the end." Id.
185. Id. at 34.
186. See id.
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age ad from the perspective of a reasonable publisher before the
murder,'87 the outcome would likely have been far different. From
that perspective, the court could not have overlooked the ad's fundamental ambiguity quite so easily. Thus, like the Eimann court, the
Braun court should have held, as a matter of law, that SOF cannot be
held liable for the publication of a fundamentally ambiguous advertisement.
E. Two Distinct First Amendment Applications in Legally Indistinguishable Cases
Because both Eimann and Braun proceeded to the appellate level
on essentially identical factual and legal foundations, the discrepancy in
outcomes resulted from each circuit's distinct method of integrating
SOF's First Amendment arguments into each underlying negligence
action. Had there been explicit High Court authority defining the extent
to which publishers are protected by the First Amendment for the advertisements they print, both circuits would almost certainly have
reached the same outcome. However, because each court was forced to
improvise its own liability standard, each court also afforded SOF's
First Amendment arguments the weight it felt such arguments merit.
As a result, the liability standards ultimately applied by each court
were remarkably dissimilar.
Although the Eimann court never discussed SOF's First Amendment arguments as a separate issue,"88 it clearly did not ignore the
defense. Instead, the Fifth Circuit in Eimann recognized "the important
role" of First Amendment considerations "for purposes of the risk-benefit analysis." '8 9 Consequently, the Eimann court took the position
that SOF's First Amendment arguments should be factored directly into
the benefit side of the risk-utility balancing test. Therefore, a court
utilizing this factoring approach would not only calculate society's
overall benefit from exposure to the particular advertisement, but would
also figure into the equation the publisher's limited First Amendment

187. See id.
188. Eimann, 880 F.2d at 834.
189. Id. at 836
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right to publish the ad in the first place. Because the Fifth Circuit
overturned the Eimann trial court verdict without ever discussing
SOF's First Amendment arguments, however, there is no way of knowing how much weight those arguments would have carried in the final
analysis. Likewise, there is no way of determining what consideration
any publisher's First Amendment arguments would merit in future Fifth
Circuit decisions.
The Eleventh Circuit in Braun, on the other hand, took an entirely
more restrictive approach toward SOF's First Amendment arguments.
Rather than adopt the Eimann court's risk-utility factoring approach,
the Braun court insisted that a modified negligence standard gives
adequate conideration to SOF's First Amendment arguments. 9 ' Under the Eleventh Circuit's modified negligence approach, the actual
risk-benefit equation is not altered whatsoever by any First Amendment
considerations. Instead, SOF is simply relieved of any duty to investigate essentially ambiguous advertisements that may be suggestive of
the advertiser's criminal intent." ' However, other courts which have
addressed the publisher liability issue prior to Braun have held almost
unanimously that publishers have no duty to investigate the ads they
print.'92 Thus, the modified negligence standard provided SOF with
no more First Amendment protection than what it likely already enjoyed. Rather, the standard merely purported to relieve SOF of a duty
to investigate - a duty it likely did not bear anyway.
Furthermore, the Braun court's modified negligence standard is
constitutionally inflexible. It offers no more First Amendment protection to an advertisement that is only slightly suggestive of an
advertiser's criminal intent than to one that is blatantly suggestive.
Thus, because the modified negligence standard is duplicative of other
First Amendment protections and cannot be constitutionally adapted to
individual cases, the Eleventh Circuit would have been wise to apply
the factoring approach utilized previously in Eimann. Because the Eleventh Circuit chose to break with clearly established Fifth Circuit prece-

190. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1118-19.
191. Id. at 1119.
192. See supra notes 51-65 and accompanying text.
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dent, however, Eimann and Braun were decided inconsistently, despite
the obvious factual and legal similarities shared by the cases.
IV.

RESOLVING THE SPLIT

Despite the Eleventh Circuit's suspect attempt to draw factual and
legal distinctions between the Eimann and Braun cases, the two are
practically indistinguishable in both respects. However, because the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in both Eimann93 and Braun,'94
there is no High Court resolution to the issue of third-party publisher
liability based on these two particular cases. Nonetheless, the following
discussion of Braun's First Amendment implications will shed considerable light on how the Eimann/Braun split should have been resolved.
A. First Amendment Considerations
In Braun, the Eleventh Circuit embarked on a rather lengthy but
substantially misplaced analysis of the limitations to SOF's First
Amendment protections.'95 Initially, dicta within Braun suggests the
Eleventh Circuit's willingness to acknowledge that SOF is entitled to at
least some First Amendment commercial speech protection. Specifically, the court cited Virginia Pharmacy'96 in acknowledging that the
First Amendment protects speech that "does 'no more than propose a
commercial transaction."' 97 The court also cited Central Hudson'98
in noting that "society has an interest in commercial speech because it
facilitates intelligent and well-informed economic decisions. '99 The
court further acknowledged that overly oppressive tort-law burdens on
publishers regarding the advertisements those publishers choose to print
may "impermissibly impose a form of self-censorship on publish-

193. 493 U.S. 1024 (1990).
194. 113 S. Ct. 1028 (1993).
195. See Braun, 968 F.2d at 1116-20.
196. 425 U.S. at 762. See also supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
197. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1117 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
198. 447 U.S. at 561-62. See also supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
199. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1117 (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561-62).
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ers,"2 00 and that such a chilling effect could deprive protected speech
."of a legitimate and recognized avenue of access to the public. '20 '
Finally, the court acknowledged that publishers have a substantially
lesser financial interest in the advertisements they print than do the
advertisers themselves.2 2 Accordingly, imposition of liability on publishers for the commercial speech they print may indirectly threaten
fully-protected core speech by forcing publishers to refrain from
printing many ambiguous advertisements that financially support the
accompanying core speech.2 3 In fact, such a restraint may ultimately
force the source of the core speech out of business.2 4
However, while the Braun court was willing to acknowledge
SOF's entitlement to certain specific First Amendment commercial
speech protections, it also recognized Georgia's interest in imposing
liability on publishers for printing advertisements related to criminal
activity. 205 Accordingly, the court purported to strike a balance by
upholding the "modified" negligence standard utilized by the district
court. 206 When applied to the risk-utility balancing test, the modified
negligence standard severely restricts the First Amendment protection
of publishers. As applied by the Eleventh Circuit, the First Amendment
plays no greater role in the risk-utility balancing test than to relieve
SOF of any duty the magazine may have had to investigate the ads it
printed.20 7
In support of its decision to restrict SOF's First Amendment protection solely to application of the modified negligence standard, the
Braun court made a dubious inferential leap. Specifically, the court
compared the modified negligence standard to the Supreme Court's
prior First Amendment limitations on the rights of the individual states

200. Id. See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 277 (the threat of

state tort law damages may be more chilling to free speech in the commercial context than
the threat of criminal sanctions); supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.

201. Id. (quoting Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 493 (1962)).
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 1117-18 (citing Firenze, supra note 8, at 167).
Id at 1118.
Ia
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1118-19.
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to impose liability on publishers in defamation cases." 8 In its discussion, the court correctly looked to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,"9
in which the Supreme Court limited publisher liability to cases where
the defamatory statement was made with "actual malice."" As soon
as the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the Sullivan rule, however, it

reversed its logical direction, holding that "the First Amendment does
not require this high level of protection for all speech in all contexts."' Specifically, the Braun court relied on Gertz v. Robert

Welch, Inc.," 2 in which the Supreme Court held that "the States may
define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood ... as long as a state does
not impose liability without fault."2 3 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit in
Braun attempted to justify its severe limitation of SOF's First Amendment protections by adopting the Gertz liability standard, conceived
exclusively for application in defamation cases, and superimposing its

First Amendment implications directly onto a negligent advertising context.
In making such a broad inferential leap from one liability context
to the other, however, the Eleventh Circuit misapplied the explicit
liability condition stated in Gertz to the facts in Braun. As discussed

208. Id. at 1118.
209. 376 U.S. 254 (1964); supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
210. Id. at 279-81 (quoting Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 231 (Kan. 1908)). A statement is made with "actual malice" when the speaker made the statement "with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 280.
211. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1118.
212. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). In this case, a libel action was brought by a Chicago lawyer
against the defendant publisher. The plaintiff alleged that the publisher had inaccurately titled
him as a "Leninisf' and a "Communist-fronter." Id. at 326. Although the plaintiff was neither a public official nor a public figure, the defendant publisher claimed a First Amendment privilege against liability for the defamatory statements. Id at 329. The Supreme Court
held that there is no constitutional privilege to print defamatory statements about individuals
who are not public figures or public officials. Id. at 345-46. The Court further held that
states may define their own standards of publisher liability for printing defamatory statements
against private citizens, but only where "the substance of the defamatory statement 'makes
substantial danger to reputation apparent' and only where liability is "based on a showing
of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth." Id. at 347-349 (quoting Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967)).
213. Id at 347 (emphasis added).
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previously, the Braun court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's
holding in Gertz that states may determine their own standards of liability in defamation cases, as long as they do not impose liability without fault.214 But in the very same paragraph, the Supreme Court limited its holding to cases where "the substance of the defamatory statement 'makes substantial danger to reputation apparent.""'21 In fact,
the Gertz court was rather insistent that no liability exists "if a state
purport[s] to condition civil liability on a factual misstatement whose
content did not warn 216
a reasonably prudent editor or broadcaster of its
defamatory potential.
While the Eleventh Circuit was obviously aware that Gertz conditions publisher liability in the defamation context upon "apparent"
harm,217 its application of that condition to the facts in Braun indicate its unwillingness to enforce the condition in the negligent advertising context. Specifically, the Braun court took the position that a modified negligence standard adequately protects SOF's First Amendment
rights because the potential for harm to the public conveyed by the
language of the Savage ad was indeed "apparent. ' 21 "Apparent" is
defined as "[t]hat which is obvious, evident, or manifest ....55219
However, the language contained in the Savage ad, as discussed previously, is entirely ambiguous.220 Certainly there is no language whatsoever that, on its face, would make its danger obvious, evident, or especially manifest to any "reasonably prudent editor. '22 Rather, the
Braun court appeared so determined to restrict SOF's First Amendment
rights to the modified negligence standard that it would be willing to
classify the potential harm associated with even the most slightly suggestive ad as obvious, evident, or manifest. Thus, by attempting to
shape the facts in Braun into a Gertz liability mold to which it clearly
does not fit, the Eleventh Circuit unconstitutionally deprived SOF of its

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id.
Id. at 348 (quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967)).
Id. (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)).
Braun, 968 F.2d at 1119.
Id. at 1121.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 76 (6th ed. 1991).
See supra notes 163-83 and accompanying text.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348 (applying Black's definition of "apparent").
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First Amendment rights. Clearly, therefore, the Eleventh Circuit should
have focused its First Amendment discussion on the more closely related commercial speech precedent, rather than embarking on a dubious
"fishing expedition" into defamation law.
B. The Modern Commercial Speech Doctrine Revisited
Despite all other factors discussed thus far, the Supreme Court
could hardly resolve the Eimann/Braun split decisively without consulting the commercial speech cases. Although the commercial speech
cases do not address the issue of third-party publisher liability, they do
comprise the closest line of High Court precedent available. 2 Central Hudson remains the definitive test arising from that line of precedent. Applying the four-part Central Hudson test to the issue of publisher liability may be problematic, however, because that decision
appears to be limited to state action against advertisers themselves, as
opposed to tort action against publishers who merely print the
advertisers' messages.'
However, other Supreme Court decisions have demonstrated that
state control over the exercise of free speech is hardly limited to direct
government regulation of various types of speech, including advertising.
For instance, a state can effectively restrict the free dissemination of
commercial information to an equal extent through its tort laws as it
can through outright regulation of advertisers and publishers. 4 Accordingly, because state tort law restrictions that "impose a form of
self-censorship on publishers" are clearly impermissible, those restrictions must be subject to the same First Amendment scrutiny of governmental overreaching to which direct restrictions of commercial speech
are subject.2" Therefore, because the Braun decision so strongly sug-

222. See infra notes 223-34 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
225. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1117. Both the Eimann and Braun courts seem to agree that
the commercial speech cases discussed in Sections II.A.-C. are at least tangentially related to
the discussion of third-party publisher liability for tortious advertising. Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy and Central Hudson are cited throughout the Eimann and Braun opinions. See
Eimann, 880 F.2d at 836-37; Braun, 968 F.2d at 1117-18. In addition, the Braun court cited
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gests the possibility of government overreaching through state tort law,
the Central Hudson test should be applied to the facts in Braun to
determine whether SOF's First Amendment rights were violated.
Applying the Central Hudson test to the facts in Braun would
require that the focus of the four-part test be adapted to the nature of
the issue and factual circumstances of the parties involved. The substance of the test itself, however, would not be altered in the least. For
instance, the first prong of the test requires that the expression of
speech be one that the First Amendment is able to protect.2 6 This
means it "at least must concern lawful activity and must not be mis' As applied to Braun, the expression
leading."227
of speech at issue is
obviously the Savage advertisement. The ad was clearly not misleading,
and whether it concerned lawful activity is generally not an issue. For
instance, the plaintiffs in Braun never argued that the Savage ad, on its
face, represented a solicitation to engage in unlawful activity. However,
the Brauns did contend that the ad was suggestive enough to constitute
an "unreasonable risk" that "violent criminal activity" would result
from its publication. 28 As discussed earlier, however, the Savage ad
was both ambiguous and facially innocuous. 229 Thus, despite the
Brauns' "um'easonable risk" contention, the ad clearly constitutes a
commercial expression which the First Amendment is able to protect.
Accordingly, the first prong of the Central Hudson test is satisfied.
The second prong requires that the government interest in regulating the commercial speech be "substantial." 30 If this prong of the
test is applied to the facts in Braun, then the focus of the commercial
speech regulation shifts from direct government regulation of advertisers to state tort law restrictions on publishers. Likewise, the government interest at issue is no longer direct regulation of commercial
speech. Instead, in the context of publisher liability cases such as
Sullivan on numerous occasions. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1116 n.5, 1118, 1121 n.13, 1122. Fox
is cited in Eimann, 880 F.2d at 836, and Braun, 968 F.2d at 1117.
226. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. See also Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. at 388; supra note 33 and accompanying text.
227. Id.
228. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 163-83 and accompanying text.
230. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
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Braun, the government interest at issue is the state's ability to provide
a civil remedy for its citizens who may be harmed by the tortious
conduct of other citizens. It is highly unlikely that SOF or any other
defendant publisher could make a persuasive argument that a state has
no substantial interest in providing tort law remedies to its injured
citizens.
The same is true for the third prong of the test. This prong requires that the government restriction at issue, the Georgia state tort
law applied in Braun, must "directly advance[ ] the governmental interest asserted," namely Georgia's interest in providing civil remedies
to its tortiously injured citizensY a Any SOF argument that Georgia's
statutory and common law tort principles fail in general to directly
advance that state's interest in providing legal remedies in tort would
not be only futile, but far beyond any judicial remedy.
Where the Braun decision fails to pass constitutional muster, however, is on the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test. In the context
of third-party publisher liability, this prong requires that a state's tort
law be no more restrictive of protected commercial speech than is
absolutely required to provide a civil remedy to its tortiously injured
citizens. 2 Accordingly, when applied to the facts in Braun, the Eleventh Circuit clearly violated SOF's First Amendment rights by
impermissibly overextending the First Amendment limitations of Georgia tort law. The overreaching is evident in Braun because, as discussed, the Savage ad was both fundamentally ambiguous and facially
innocuous.233 While the Brauns argued that the Savage ad was highly
suggestive of the advertiser's willingness to commit criminal acts, no
language on the face of the ad expressly communicated any criminal
intent.234 Therefore, SOF had no affirmative duty to reject the facially
innocuous ad, despite its being implicitly suggestive.
When third-party liability is legally based upon a guessing game of
what a prospective advertiser may be implying when the advertiser

231.
232.
233.
234.

Id.
See id.
See supra notes 163-183 and accompanying text.
Id.
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places an ad, a potentially ruinous slippery slope of liability is created
for the publishing industry. As the Eimann court astutely observed,
advertisements for high performance cars do not become solicitations
for illegal activities simply because "buyers drive them beyond the
speed limit." 5 Nor does the publisher of the ad become liable to the
driver when the ad appears in a "magazine that also contains ads for
'
In other words, once courts like the Braun court
radar detectors."236
allow publishers to be held liable in tort for what their advertisers may
be implying, then advertising can no longer be a vital function of the
publishing business. The publishing industry would be faced with financial disaster in the wave of liability claims that would inevitably
confront it." 7
Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court's holdings in Posadas and Fox would render a different result. In Fox, the
Court demonstrated a willingness to relax the "no more restrictive than
necessary" prong of the Central Hudson test if the government could
demonstrate that the speech restriction at issue was "narrowly tailored
to achieve the desired objective." '38 Thus, if the Fox test were applied to the facts in Braun, the Court would determine whether
Georgia's common law tort principles were narrowly tailored to its
ultimate goal of compensating deserving plaintiffs. 39
Applying the narrowly tailored test to the facts in Braun, the
Court would likely hold that the Braun liability standard is unconstitutionally restrictive of SOF's First Amendment free speech rights. As
discussed previously, the liability standard applied in Braun, the modified negligence standard, fails to factor First Amendment rights of
235. 880 F.2d at 836.
236. Id
237. See id. at 837.
238. 490 U.S. at 480. See also supra note 48 and accompanying text.
239. Although the narrowly tailored test has traditionally been used to determine the
constitutionality of statutes, see, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University of the
State of New York, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (striking down an anti-subversive activities statute
for failing to combat subversive activities with the requisite narrow specificity); United States
v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (striking down another anti-subversive activities statute on
constitutional grounds for similar reasons), its application to common law liability standards

is not unforeseeable. For purposes of analysis, this Note will assume that the narrowly tailored test is adaptable to common law liability standard scrutiny.
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publishers directly into the risk-utility balancing test. ° For purposes
of the risk-utility balancing test, therefore, First Amendment considerations are essentially ignored under Braun-type liability standards. By
ignoring all First Amendment considerations, a significant amount of
commercial speech, which would otherwise be privileged, is unconstitutionally stripped of First Amendment protection. As a result, the First
Amendment rights of publishers to disseminate otherwise protected
commercial information are subordinated to individual state common
law remedies for tort victims.
Under the Fox test, however, state interests may trump otherwise
" ' Thus,
protected speech only when applied with narrow specificity.24
any liability standard, such as the Braun court's modified negligence
standard, which allows plaintiffs to recover for nontortious speech,
cannot be narrowly tailored to a particular state's ultimate goal of
compensating tort victims. Speech protected by the First Amendment
is, by definition, nontortious. Accordingly, unless First Amendment
principles are factored directly into the applicable liability standard,
then otherwise privileged commercial speech is unconstitutionally
chilled by state tort law. Therefore, the Supreme Court would likely
hold that Georgia tort law, as applied in Braun, is unconstitutionally
restrictive because it not only sanctions speech that the First Amendment is not intended to protect, but also that which it is.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Braun is disturbing. Despite
being confronted with a factual setting nearly identical to that faced by
the Fifth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit purported to justify its departure
from the Eimann precedent by distinguishing the cases factually. Nonetheless, the Braun court clearly failed to make any factual distinctions
significant enough to justify its impetuous departure. Furthermore, the
Braun court twisted traditioiial First Amendment analysis of commercial speech protection beyond recognition. Rather than rely on the
available commercial speech precedent, the Braun court attempted to
240. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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justify its constitutionally overrestrictive liability standard by comparing
it to liability standards conceived exclusively for defamation cases.
However, the obvious dissimilarities between the commercial speech
context and the defamation context logically prevent the importation of
liability standards from one area of law to the other. Thus, if the Supreme Court had agreed to resolve the Eimann/Braun split, it is unlikely that Braun would have survived the Court's First Amendment
scrutiny.
Why the Supreme Court declined to resolve the issue of thirdparty publisher liability based on these two cases is truly perplexing.
The clearly defined split between the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits afforded the Court a golden opportunity to resolve a controversial issue
which it had previously been unwilling to address. Increasingly, state
and lower federal courts are being forced to wrestle with the First
Amendment implications of third-party publisher liability.242 Accordingly, the Einann/Braun split is, in all likelihood, indicative of the
inconsistency with which other federal circuits will decide the issue if
faced with similar cases. The implications of the Supreme Court's
failure to overturn Braun range, however, far beyond the federal circuit
courts. The High Court's indecisiveness has left publishers without a
reliable standard of conduct with which to conform future publication
decisions. If publishers choose to follow the Eimann standard, they risk
potentially ruinous tort liability judgments. If they choose to conform
to the Braun standard instead, they stand to lose considerable advertising revenue resulting from the legally mandated rejection of any and
all ads that could possibly be interpreted by a jury as posing a "clearly
identifiable risk of harm to the public." '43 As the Braun verdict demonstrates, even. highly ambiguous ads may fall prey to such a seemingly unsubstantiated interpretation. Either way, SOF was clearly not the
only losing party in the Braun decision. The ability of the publishing
industry to freely disseminate vital commercial information has been

242. See supra notes 51-65 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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seriously jeopardized, and the public's implied First Amendment right
to receive that information2 44 has been severely compromised as well.
Stephen T. Raptis

244. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (the First Amendment "embraces the right to distribute literature . . . and necessarily protects the right to
receive it"); Kleindeinst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1971) (the First Amendment "protects the right to receive information and ideas.").
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